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The organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as 
contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, 
maintains the trait. As it has been recently argued, however, the account 
seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra-generation and 
cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the 
maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this 
“ontological problem”, a splitting account has been proposed, according to 
which the two kinds of functions require distinct organizational definitions. 
In this paper, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing 
that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the 
same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in 
terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest 
maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the philosophical debate on the concept of biological 
function has been enriched by the development of a new approach, aimed at 
integrating the two mainstream views – the ‘etiological’ (Wright, 1973; 
Millikan, 1984, 1989; Neander, 1980, 1991; Godfrey-Smith, 1994) and the 
‘systemic-dispositional’ (Cummins, 1975; Boorse, 1976; Bigelow & 
Pargetter, 1987) – into an inclusive framework. The gist of the approach 
consists of relating functions to a distinctive feature of biological systems, 
i.e. the fact that they realize a specific kind of causal regime in which a set 
of parts generates a complex web of mutual interactions which, in turn, 
maintains the parts, so that the whole organization is collectively able to 
maintain itself through timei. In what follows, we will refer to this specific 
causal regime as a self-maintaining organization. 
Within a self-maintaining organization, in particular, functions are 
interpreted as specific causal effects of a part or trait, which contribute to 
the maintenance of the organization and, consequently, of the part itself. As 
has been emphasized (Schlosser, 1998: 327-328; Mossio et al., 2009: 12-
13), this characterization also offers a way of naturalizing into the current 
organization of biological systems the two characteristic properties of 
functions which call for a scientifically acceptable explanation, and which 
have given rise to the long-lasting philosophical debate on this notion, i.e. 
their teleology and normativity.  
On the one hand, a self-maintaining organization provides a naturalized 
grounding for the teleological dimension. Since the activity of a biological 
component X contributes, by contributing to the maintenance of the whole 
organization, to the maintenance of some of the conditions required for its 
own existence, the question “Why does X exist in that system?” can be 
legitimately answered by “Because it does Y”. This justifies explaining, 
“teleologically”, the existence of a component by referring to its causal 
effects. On the other hand, a self-maintaining organization grounds 
normativity. The activity of a self-maintaining organization has an intrinsic 
relevance for itself, to the extent that its very existence depends on the 
effects of its own activity. Such intrinsic relevance generates a naturalized 
criterion to determine what norms the system, and its parts, are supposed to 
follow. The whole system (and its parts) must behave in a specific way, 
otherwise it would cease to exist. Accordingly, the activity of the system 
and its components becomes its own norm or, more precisely, the conditions 
of existence for the organization are the intrinsic and naturalized norms of 
its own activity and of that of its componentsii. 
Because of its appeal to fundamental properties of biological organization, 
we have suggested labeling this account the organizational account to 
functionsiii, on which a considerable amount of work has already been done 
by Bickhard (2000, 2004), Schlosser (1998), Collier (1999), McLaughlin 
(2001), Christensen & Bickhard (2002) Delancey (2006), Edin (2008) and 
Mossio et al. (2009). In spite of some differences between the various 
formulations, there seems to be substantial convergence regarding the 
fundamental tenets of the organizational account, which makes it a credible 
philosophical alternative to both the etiological (mainly in its “selected-
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effects” version) and systemic-dispositional accounts. In a recent analysis, 
however, Craig Delancey (2006) emphasized a major theoretical challenge 
facing the organizational account. This challenge can be described as 
follows.  
Since functions are characterized as contributions of parts to self-
maintaining organizations, and since self-maintaining organizations are 
typically realized by individual organisms, the organizational approach 
appears to have trouble grounding functions which go beyond the 
boundaries of individual biological systems. In particular, it is unclear 
whether and, indeed, how the organizational approach would account for 
what Schlosser calls “cross-generation functions”, for instance the function 
of reproductive traits (e.g. the function of semen of inseminating the ovum). 
In these cases, in fact, the trait or part seems to contribute to the 
maintenance of the organization of a system which is distinct from the 
system of which it is a component. Hence, the part does not contribute 
either to the self-maintenance of an organization or to its own self-
maintenance. Still, we do ascribe cross-generation functions as we do, for 
instance, for the reproductive function of the semen. Apparently, then, 
cross-generation functions may constitute a major class of counterexamples 
of the organizational approach.  
Some of the authors who developed previous versions of the organizational 
account were of course aware of this issue, and proposed – following very 
different paths, as we shall see – definitions which were supposedly broad 
enough to embrace both intra- and cross-generation biological functions. 
Nevertheless, Delancey’s analysis criticizes all these “unified accounts” by 
pointing out their weaknesses and drawbacks. As an alternative, he proposes 
a “splitting account”, according to which intra-generation and cross-
generation functions are in fact two different kinds of biological function, 
requiring a different conceptual treatment.  
The aim of this paper is to offer a philosophical reply to Delancey’s 
criticism. By relying on the conceptual framework that we recently 
proposed (Mossio et al., 2009), we will suggest that the organizational 
account may provide a unified definition applying to both intra-generation 
and cross-generation functions. The essence of our argument will be that 
cross-generation functions contribute to the maintenance of systems which 
realize a self-maintaining organization in the very same sense as that of 
systems whose parts are ascribed intra-generational functions. To the extent 
that the two kinds of systems do not differ in terms of organizational self-
maintenance, there is no need to invoke two kinds of functions, and the 
ontological problem is overcome. By showing that a unified organizational 
account of function can be justified, we suggest applying Ockham’s razor to 
this specific case: since pluralitas no es ponenda sine necessitate, there is 
no need to adopt a splitting account for organizational functions.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we will discuss 
Schlosser’s approach, as well as McLaughlin’s one, both of which develop a 
unified account of functions based on the idea of traits’ capacity for self-
reproduction. We will then examine Delancey’s criticism, and recall its 
proposal of a splitting account. Section 3 will develop our own account of 
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cross-generation functions, which emphasizes, instead of the self-
reproduction of the trait, the self-maintenance of the whole organization as 
the relevant dimension in which cross-generation functions can be 
adequately naturalized. In the conclusion, we will sum up by underlying the 
reasons why our own framework appears to be in a better position to 
account for cross-generation function with respect to other organizational 
theories.  
2. Self-reproduction of traits: proposals and criticism 
Broadly speaking, the existing formulations of the organizational account 
can be regrouped into two main versions. The first version, advocated by 
Schlosser (1998) and McLaughlin (2001), tends to characterize functions as 
states or processes which are causally required for the reproduction of the 
trait which causes them. The emphasis is then on the self-reproduction of 
the trait, rather than specifically on the whole system which, nevertheless, 
must possess the adequate properties to enable trait self-reproduction. The 
second version, proposed by Collier (1999), Christensen & Bickhard (2002), 
and Mossio et al. (2009), shifts the focus onto the organization of the 
system, and interprets functions as contributions to the self-maintenance of 
the organization and therefore, as a consequence, to the self-maintenance of 
the various parts and traits. The two versions give an equivalent response 
for most function ascriptions, but cases do exist in which they may diverge. 
Indeed, the first version may have problematic implications for cases in 
which a trait self-reproduction is in conflict with the self-maintenance of the 
whole system such as, for instance, in cancer development. In this case, the 
first version could be forced to attribute, against intuition and scientific use, 
a function to the trait which self-develops, whereas the second version could 
unambiguously exclude function ascription to cancerous traits. In this paper, 
we will not analyze the differences and divergences between the two 
versions in general, but rather will examine specifically how they account 
for the ascription of cross-generation functions, and we will discuss why, in 
our view, the second version is in a better position to provide an adequate 
solution for Delancey’s criticism.  
2.1 Schlosser’s and McLaughlin’s accounts 
Schlosser (1998) proposed ascribing functions to those traits which, in a 
particular class of complex system and under certain conditions, are self-
reproducing. A trait (or state) X is functional in a given complex system if it 
causes the process or state F (its function) which, under certain conditions, 
is necessary for the self-reproduction of X. In this sense, the “functionality 
of a state can be defined as the conditional necessity for complex self-re-
production (i.e., the necessity for self-reproduction in complex systems 
under certain circumstances)” (Schlosser, 1998: 315). Systems harboring 
self-reproducing traits are, in turn, “systems that pass through cyclic 
sequences of states and thereby keep stable in the long run, despite changing 
continuously” (Schlosser, 1998: 311). The paradigmatic case of self-
reproducing complex systems, to the traits of which functions are 
ascribable, is that of biological organisms.  Schlosser proposes the following 
definition of functions: 
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“In self-re-producing systems that remain stable for a certain period 
of time T, […] F is a function of X(t) iff: 
for a certain period of time t0 < t < t + x + y < t0 + Tiv 
(1) X(t) is directly causally necessary to establish F(t + x) (under 
certain circumstances c1) 
(2) F(t + x) is indirectly causally necessary to establish X(t + x + y) 
(under certain circumstances c2) 
(3) The causal relations between X(t), F(t + x), X(t + x + y) are 
complex” (Schlosser, 1998: 315). 
This definition clarifies that the relations between X and F are not 
symmetrical, in the sense that whereas X causes F in a “relatively direct 
way”, F causes the re-production of X quite indirectly, usually through the 
complex web of interactions of the whole system. In addition, (3) restricts 
functional attributions to a specific class of systems in which self-
reproduction of traits occurs, namely “complex systems”, in order to 
exclude trivial counterexamples.   
It is worth noting, for the purposes of this paper, that this definition 
embraces self-reproduction both as the continuous re-establishment of a trait 
in the same system, and as the re-establishment of a trait of the same type in 
a new system. For instance, the function of the heart is to pump blood 
because (1) in a given period of time the heart is directly causally necessary 
to establish the pumping of the blood and (2) the pumping of the blood is 
indirectly causally necessary to re-establish the heart, and the human 
organism is certainly a complex system. Similarly, the function of semen is 
to inseminate the ovum since (1) the semen is directly causally necessary to 
establish the insemination of the ovum, (2) the insemination of the ovum is 
indirectly causally necessary to re-establish the semen (in this case, in a new 
organism) and (3) the causal relations between the semen, the insemination 
of the ovum and the new semen are complex.  
Clearly, the scheme applies to both intra-generation and cross-generation 
functions, although the two cases are not equivalent. Whereas the same 
instance of the trait self-reproduces in the case of intra-generation functions, 
it is a new instance of the same type that is reproduced through cross-
generation functionsv. In Schlosser’s framework, this difference is 
negligible from the point of view of the organizational account, since what 
matters is the fact that the trait type achieves self-reproduction. Whether this 
occurs as the re-establishment of the same instance or the establishment of a 
new instance is seen as irrelevant from the point of view of the account.  
In his recent book (2001), Peter McLaughlin develops an organizational 
account of functions which is similar to Schlosser’s one. According to 
McLaughlin, claiming that the function of X is F, means that: 
“(1) X does/enables F (in or for some system S); 
(2) F is good for some S;  
and 
(3) By being good for some S, F contributes to the (re)production of 
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X (there is a feed-back mechanism involving F’s benefiting S that 
(re)produces X). (McLaughlin 2001: 140)”  
In McLaughlin’s view, functions are ascribed to parts of systems being, in 
his terms “appropriate subject of benefit”. A system having functional parts 
is a system having a good. In turn, McLaughlin intimately associates the 
concepts of good and that of self-reproduction: “If the characteristic activity 
of an organism is its self-reproduction, then 'good for the characteristic 
activity of X' and 'good for X' are the same. This is what makes organisms, 
as opposed to inanimate objects, the appropriate subjects of benefit or harm. 
It is the fact that 'what they do makes them what they are' - not the 
(derivative) fact that they are also alive - that occasions us to attribute a 
good to them. Even a non-organic self-reproducing system could be the 
subject of benefit and thus have a good" (McLaughlin, 2001: 203).  
As we mentioned in the introduction, and will further develop in section 3, 
all organizational approaches, besides minor differences, adopt this line of 
thought to justify a naturalized grounding of norms.  
McLaughlin emphasizes the causal role of a function in (re)producing the 
function bearer by appealing to a “feedback mechanism” at work in the 
system. While the formulation differs from Schlosser’s one in various 
respects, the central idea is very much the same: the function of a trait is its 
causal effect involved in promoting its own existence. Much like Schlosser, 
McLaughlin interprets the term “reproduction” in a quite broad way, since 
the reproduction of a trait X can occur within the same system or in a new 
and distinct system (McLaughlin 2001: 180-181). Accordingly, traits 
bearing cross-generation functions contribute, through their function, to 
their own reproduction, which in this case consists of the production of an 
organ of the same type in a new individual system.  
Both Schlosser’s and McLaughlin’s accounts of cross-generation functions 
rely on the idea that the notion of “trait self-reproduction” can be adequately 
applied to the same trait token in a given system, as well as to another trait 
token of the same type in a different system. As we will discuss in the 
following section, however, Delancey has argued that the difference cannot 
be neglected, and this in turn entails a major revision of the organizational 
account.  
2.2 Delancey’s “splitting account” 
In a recent paper, Craig Delancey (2006) argues that this version of the 
organizational account suffers from what he calls an “ontological” problem, 
to the extent that the complex causal relations between the traits and their 
functions, as they are expressed by (3) in Schlosser’s scheme, are radically 
different depending on whether the functions are intra-generation or cross-
generation. According to Delancey, one reason why Schlosser’s account 
seems to be applicable to both classes of functions is because it does not 
refer to complex concrete systems as the relevant support for functional 
ascriptions, but simply to a web of complex relations, such that X(t) and 
X(t+x+y) could equally refer to either intra-generation or cross-generation 
instances of a trait, without modifying the definition.  
Yet, Delancey’s criticism consists in arguing that the mere reference to 
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“complex relations” is too abstract, and underdetermines the grounding of 
functional ascriptions. In fact, in all real cases, (biological) functions are 
ascribed to parts or states of biological organisms, in which evident 
ontological and causal differences exist between intra-generation functions, 
which concern a single trait in a single system, and cross-generation 
functions, which reproduce a trait type in different individuals. According to 
Delancey, then, Schlosser’s account succeeds in providing a unified 
definition of intra- and cross-generation functions by artificially hiding, 
without adequate justification, relevant distinctions between the two classes 
of functionsvi. 
On the basis of this criticism, Delancey develops his own account, which 
shares with Schlosser’s account the idea that the function of a trait consists 
of its contribution to its own self-reproduction. At the same time, he 
reformulates Schlosser’s scheme by proposing a double characterization of 
biological functions, which takes into account a distinction between self-
sustaining and self-reproducing functions: 
“ F is a self-sustaining teleofunction of structure type S if, for a certain 
period of time T, and where t1 < t2 < t3, and T ranges from before t1 to 
after t3: 
1. There is an instance of S, s(t1), directly causally necessary to 
establish F(t2) under circumstances c1. 
2. F(t2) is indirectly causally necessary to sustain s(t3) under 
circumstances c2. 
3. The causal relations between s(t1), F(t2), and s(t3) are part of a 
single complex system. 
 
F is a self-reproducing teleofunction of structure type S if, for a certain 
period of time T, and where t1 < t2 < t3; and where T ranges from 
before t1 to after t3: 
1. There is an instance of S, s1(t1), that is directly causally necessary to 
establish F(t2) under circumstances c1. 
2. F(t2) is indirectly causally necessary to establish some instance of S, 
s2(t3) under circumstances c2. 
3. The causal relations between s1(t1), F(t2), and s2(t3) are part of at 
least one complex system; if they are part of more than one complex 
system, then these are of the same type of complex system. 
4. It is not the case that s1 = s2 (Delancey, 2006: 91-92)”. 
In this scheme then, “complex system” means “individual organism”, with 
no reference to any other broader or encompassing systems. Of course, 
other systems than individual organisms could be interpreted as complex 
systems, which would be relevant for function ascriptions. Yet, as Delancey 
suggests, not only is there no proof that functions could be ascribed to other 
systems than organisms, but in fact there is no need. Indeed, the distinction 
between intra- and cross-generation functions is captured by point 4 in the 
definition of self-reproducing functions, which explicitly states that the 
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reproduction concerns a different instance of a trait type.   
Delancey’s analysis and splitting account emphasizes the difficulties 
involved in formulating a unified definition able to deal coherently with 
both intra- and cross-generation biological functions within the 
organizational view. Delancey himself considers that a unified definition 
would be, in principle, a more elegant and palatable alternative to his 
splitting account but, at present, practical reasons suggest adopting his own 
proposal. As he writes:  
“Since the splitting account I describe is sufficient, and is also satisfied 
by the implicit work that goes into preparing the way for either of the 
unproblematic forms of the unified account, Ockham’s razor cuts in 
favour of the splitting account alone. This then poses a challenge to the 
unified account: a viable unified account must explain how we are to 
identify events or complex relations without reference to individual 
organisms and their structures; or, it must explain what benefits the 
account has which make it preferable to the simpler splitting account. If 
the unified account cannot do either of these, then the splitting account is 
preferable both because it is simpler and because it is already implicitly 
satisfied in the preliminary work required to develop a unified account 
(Delancey, 1996: 94-95)”. 
We agree with Delancey that a unified definition would be more elegant, 
and that it should be able to answer Delancey’s challenge and demonstrate 
its superiority over the splitting account. In the following section, we will 
first introduce our own version of the organizational account and then 
propose our solution to the ontological problem.  
3. Self-maintenance of systems 
The second main version of the organizational account regroups several 
contributions developed by Collier (1999), Christensen & Bickhard (2002), 
and ourselves (2009) which, despite sharing the same fundamental 
inspiration as the previous version, follow a different path. Instead of 
interpreting functions as those effects which contribute to the self-
reproduction of the trait within a given kind of complex system, it 
conceptualizes functions as contributions to the self-maintenance of the 
system which consequently results in the maintenance of the trait. The 
various formulations of this second version are basically the same in their 
core framework, despite some major differences in terminology. However, 
we believe that our own proposal develops its central concepts and 
implications in more detail, thus making a comparison with the accounts 
discussed above easier. For this reason, we will refer to it in the following 
section.   
3.1 Functions and organizational closure 
In a recent contribution (Mossio et al., 2009), we developed an 
organizational account of biological functions that relies on the 
understanding of biological systems as a class of highly complex natural 
self-maintaining systems. The idea of self-maintenance comes from a 
theoretical and mathematical framework developed over the last 40 years by 
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an increasingly rich body of scientific literature in fields such as theoretical 
biology, complex systems theory and far-from-equilibrium 
thermodynamics. This notion refers to a specific causal regime, realized by 
various kinds of natural systems, by which a given system is able to exert a 
causal influence on its surroundings so to maintain (at least some of) the 
boundary conditions required for its own existence.  
In its minimal form, the idea of self-maintenance is shown in the so-called 
“dissipative structures” (Glansdorff and Prigogine, 1971; Nicolis and 
Prigogine, 1977), i.e. systems in which a macroscopic ordered pattern (a 
“structure”), emerging in the presence of a specific flow of energy and 
matter in far-from-thermodynamic equilibrium (FFE) boundary conditions, 
exerts a constraining action on its boundary conditions that contributes to 
the maintenance of that FFE flow of energy and matter required for its own 
persistence (Ruiz-Mirazo, 2001: 59). In nature, a very broad set of physical 
and chemical systems, such as Bénard cells, flames, whirlwinds, hurricanes 
and oscillatory chemical reactions can be pertinently described as self-
maintaining dissipative systems (Chandresekhar, 1961; Field et al., 1972; 
Field and Noyes, 1974).  
Since dissipative structures exist only insofar as the adequate boundary far-
from-equilibrium conditions are maintained, and since the structure itself 
contributes to maintaining these conditions, the activity of the system 
becomes a necessary (even if not sufficient) condition – a dynamic 
presupposition, in Bickhard’s (2000) terms – for the system itself. The 
system has to maintain an appropriate interaction with its surroundings to 
maintain itself.  
Our organizational approach claims that self-maintenance constitutes the 
relevant causal regime in which the teleological and normative dimensions 
of functions can be adequately naturalized. Let us take the simple example 
of a flame. The flame, as Bickhard (2000: 114) points out, makes several 
contributions to the maintenance of the FFE conditions required for its own 
existence. Indeed, the flame keeps the temperature above the combustion 
threshold, vaporizes wax, and induces convection (which pulls in oxygen 
and removes combustion products). Accordingly, to the question “Why does 
the flame exist?” it is legitimate to answer “Because it does X”: the 
existence of the reactions of combustion (the flame itself) is teleologically 
explained (at least in part) by taking into account their causal effects.  
Moreover, because of the teleological dimension, what a self-maintaining 
system does is relevant, makes a difference for itself, since its very existence 
depends on the effects of its activity. Such mutual dependence between their 
existence and activity, which is specific to self-maintaining systems, 
provides an intrinsic and naturalizedvii criterion to determine what norms the 
system, and its parts, are supposed to follow.  
The conditions of existence of the system are here interpreted as the norms 
of its own activity: the flame must behave in a specific way, otherwise it 
would cease to exist.  
While FFE self-maintenance grounds as such the teleological and normative 
dimensions of functions, it is not enough to naturalize them. Components of 
dissipative structures do not have functions. The reason is, in our view, that 
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the very idea of function requires, in addition to teleology and normativity, 
that of a certain type of organization based on a set of mutually dependent 
constraints (Moreno & Ruiz-Mirazo 2009). Let us develop this idea a bit 
more. Dissipative structures are minimal self-maintaining systems, in the 
sense that, although they may be quite complex in terms of the variety of 
their material components, they produce a single structure that works as a 
constraint on its own boundary conditions. In dissipative structures, there is 
only one structure which, by harnessing the microscopic surrounding 
dynamics, maintains the conditions of its own existence and realizes the 
teleological and normative dimensions.  
In contrast, we believe, functional attributions require an additional 
dimension, so that the interplay between a set of mutually dependent 
structures acting as constraints, each of which makes a specific and distinct 
contribution, realizes self-maintenance by maintaining the boundary 
conditions at which the whole organization, as well as its various structures, 
can exist. The mutual dependence between a set of constraints, collectively 
realizing self-maintenance, is what we call an organizational closure. In 
organizational closure, each process or part is, to use Bickhard’s terms 
above, dynamically presupposed by the other processes and parts to the 
overall self-maintenance of the system, such that the whole network must 
work in a specific and adequate way otherwise, because of its FFE nature, 
the system would disintegrateviii.  
We label the resulting causal regime a self-maintaining organization, and 
we claim that it constitutes the relevant ground for functional attributions. 
Indeed, the idea of a self-maintaining organization possesses all the 
dimensions required to naturalize functions and in particular, in contrast to 
minimal self-maintaining systems, the internal differentiation of 
contributions to the maintenance of the system. Since the various constraints 
exert different causal effects, are mutually dependent and contribute to the 
maintenance of an organization upon whose maintenance their own 
existence depends, these parts have functions, and functional ascriptions 
here play an explanatory role.  
The intimate association between complexity and integration at work in a 
self-maintaining organization is the relevant ground of functional discourse. 
The most typical example of organizationally self-maintaining systems are 
biological systems. Consider, for instance, a biological cell. In a cell, 
different structures make distinct contributions to self-maintenance. The 
membrane — as a whole, integrated structure made out of many different 
molecules — acts as a constraint that (among other things) ensures adequate 
internal concentrations of metabolites. In turn, DNA (among other things) 
acts as a template for the synthesis of proteins, which have to be 
continuously renewed due to their high rate of decay. In a word, the cell 
possesses different parts, produced within and by the system, that contribute 
differently to the maintenance of the organization and thus, of themselves. 
In this way, functional attributions to each part are grounded.  
Let us recall our definitionix. According to our account, a trait T has a 
function if, and only if, it is subject to organizational self-maintenance in a 
system S. This definition implies the fulfillment of three different 
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conditions. Accordingly, a trait T has a function if and only if: 
C1. T contributes to the maintenance of the organization O of S;  
C2. T is produced and maintained under some constraints exerted by 
O; 
C3. S realizes organizational closure. 
Accordingly, the heart has the function of pumping blood since (C1) 
pumping blood contributes to the maintenance of the organism by allowing 
blood to circulate, which in turn enables the transport of nutrients to and 
waste away from cells, the stabilization of body temperature and pH, and so 
on. At the same time, (C2) the heart is produced and maintained under 
various constraints exerted by the organism, whose overall integrity is 
required for the ongoing existence of the heart itself. Lastly (C3), the 
organism realizes organizational closure, since it is constituted by a set of 
mutually dependent structures which, by contributing in different ways to 
the maintenance of the organization, collectively realize self-maintenance.  
Is our organizational account able to account simultaneously for intra- and 
cross-generation functions? At first sight, it does not. Cross-generation 
traits, while they do have a function in biological systems, do not seem to be 
subject to organizational closure in any individual system. Indeed, cross-
generation traits are not subject to closure in either the reproducing system 
(in which they satisfy C2 but not C1), since they do not contribute to the self-
maintenance of the system producing and maintaining them, or the 
reproduced system (in which they satisfy C1 but not C2). In this sense, it 
seems that, in our organizational account, cross-generation traits are not 
functional with respect to any concrete self-maintaining system.  
Should we adopt a splitting account so that, when applied to cross-
generation functions, the instance of the trait T mentioned in C1 is not the 
same as that mentioned in C2, even if they belong to the same type? In what 
follows we will try to show that we do not need to follow that path.  
3.2 Second order self-maintaining systems? 
A possible alternative solution to the splitting account, different from 
Schlosser’s one, has been envisaged by Christensen and Bickhard (2002) 
who, by developing ideas formulated by Bickhard (2000; 2004) and Collier 
(1999), have proposed an organizational account of functions which is very 
close to that we described in the previous section. The central idea of this 
account consists of naturalizing the teleological and normative dimensions 
of functions through the notion of biological autonomy. Biological systems 
are autonomous systems in the sense of being self-governed systems, 
constituted by a network of interdependent processes, and continuously 
maintained by their own internal organization. In addition, they are able to 
modify themselves and modulate their behavior in response to external 
stimulation, in order to maintain or even improve their global viability.  
In their view, the very idea of functionality is related to the contribution to 
the maintenance of the conditions of existence of an autonomous system. 
Contributing to autonomy is as such functional because the contribution of 
each component or trait helps, in the end, to contribute to the continued 
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existence of the system and therefore, because of the interdependence 
between the parts, to their own maintenance. “This is the core for the 
emergence of function: a contribution to the maintenance of the far-from-
equilibrium conditions of a far-from-equilibrium system is functional, it 
serves a function, for the stability, the persistence, of that system” 
(Bickhard, 2004: 129). 
How do they handle cross-generation functions? The proposal tabled by 
Christensen & Bickhard (and Collier) consists of explicitly granting systems 
(like populations or species) the status of autonomous systems, making 
them relevant supports for functional attributions just as individual 
organisms: “Living organisms in general are autonomous systems, as are 
reproductive lineages, species, and some kinds of biological communities’ 
(Christensen & Bickhard 2002: 3). As a consequence, intra-generation and 
cross-generation functions are simply contributions to the maintenance of 
the autonomous organization of different kinds of concrete systems. 
Whereas intra-generation functions would contribute to the autonomous 
organization of individual organisms, cross-generation functions would 
contribute to the autonomous organization of the lineage, the species or the 
biological community in question.   
Christensen & Bickhard offer an elegant alternative to the splitting account 
by admitting the idea of “second-order autonomous systems”, more 
complex systems which would include individual organisms as parts, and 
which would ground the ascription of cross-generation functions. 
Accordingly, metabolic pathways are functional because they contribute to 
the autonomy of the cell, the heart is functional because it contributes to the 
autonomy of the vertebrate, and the semen is functional because it 
contributes to the autonomy of the species.  
Yet, this solution, just as Schlosser’s one, is problematic, as Delancey’s 
lucid criticism (2006) shows. As this author points out, the fact of 
considering those higher-order systems that are relevant for grounding 
cross-generation functions as autonomous systems does not come without a 
price. Whereas an individual organism is a paradigmatic case of an 
autonomous system, “the sense in which the species or some population is a 
complex system of the appropriate kind is much more difficult to discern” 
(Delancey, 2006: 90). For instance (the list could be longer), such higher-
level systems have no clear boundaries and no stable form and it is hard to 
see how their identity is generated by their own internal organization, as is 
the case for autonomous systems.  
According to Delancey, the organizational account has not explored these 
radical differences with sufficient accuracy, which means that the 
interpretation of higher-level systems as autonomous systems appears, to 
say the least, to be an ad hoc hypothesis to cover reluctant cases. To the 
extent that Christensen & Bickhard appeal to the idea of autonomy in a 
fairly general sense, we assume that Delancey’s criticism applies equally to 
an interpretation of higher-level systems as organizational self-maintaining 
systems, which could be put forward within our own conceptual 
frameworkx. 
Yet, one might argue that other biological supra-organismic systems do 
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possess the properties required to be considered FFE self-maintaining 
organizations. Let us explore another possibility, not mentioned by 
Delancey’s analysis: the ecosystem. Compared to species, lineages or 
populations, there seems indeed to be better reasons for considering 
ecosystems as higher-level systems, relevant for functional attributions, 
especially if one adopts our characterization in terms of self-maintaining 
organization, rather than in the more demanding terms of autonomy. 
Although there are clear differences (just to mention one: the ecosystem has 
no physical boundaries), ecosystems share several organizational properties 
with individual organisms. For instance, the various components (many of 
them being the individual organisms themselves) contribute to maintaining 
a global organization (the ecosystem itself), which in turn is a general 
condition for their own continuous existence. Similarly, the various 
(categories of) components seem to be mutually dependent, so that that the 
disappearance, death or anomalous behavior of one may provoke the 
collapse of the whole ecosystem.  
For these and other reasons, the ecosystem has much in common with an 
organism, and in fact it does not seem unreasonable, despite being 
somewhat uncommon, to use a functional discourse to describe it. So, for 
instance, we could describe and explain the organization of an ecosystem by 
attributing to its various components functions such as the regulation of air, 
climate, water, water supply, disturbance prevention, soil formation and 
erosion, nutrient cycling, waste treatment, pollination, biological control of 
pests and diseases and so on (de Groot et al 2002). Specifically, cross-
generation traits would have the function of regenerating the various 
components of the ecosystem, which would tend to decay because of their 
dissipative nature.  
In our view, the idea that the ecosystem is at least an organizational self-
maintaining system, and possibly an autonomous system, is an attractive 
one, deserving further investigation. Yet we think that, although a coherent 
description of whatever second-order system in terms of autonomy or 
organizational self-maintenance could be provided, the issue would be 
largely irrelevant for solving the problem of cross-generation functions 
within the organizational approach. In our view, in fact, the reason why we 
attribute functions to cross-generation traits is not related to their 
contribution to the maintenance of some higher-level system. Cross-
generation functions, as we will argue in the following section, do not 
require a full-fledged account of higher-level autonomous or self-
maintaining systems to be adequately naturalized within an organizational 
account.  
3.3 A solution of the ontological problem  
The gist of our account of cross-generation functions consists of arguing 
that the apparent difficulty in integrating them into the definition does not 
stem from an ontological difference between intra- and cross-generation 
functions but, rather, from an inadequate understanding of what a self-
maintaining organization actually is. Cross-generation functions constitute a 
“recalcitrant” class of functions only if the boundaries of the self-
maintaining organization  are confused with the boundaries of the individual 
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organisms, whereas in fact, as we will argue below, they are not the same. 
Once this confusion has been cleared up, Delancey’s ontological problem 
disappears.  
In our account, functional traits are those traits that, by being submitted to 
organizational closure, contribute to the maintenance of an organization, 
which in turn exerts some causal influence on the production and 
maintenance of the traits. The whole system, as we discussed, realizes a 
self-maintaining organization. The first remark is that a self-maintaining 
organization occurs in time, and can be observed only in time. Thus, 
ascribing functions to traits or parts requires the consideration of a system 
that realizes self-maintenance during a period of time long enough for 
organizational closure to be observed. Arguably, the relevant time scale may 
vary according to the specific function: the organizational closure to which 
the function of the lung is subject is realized in a very short period of time 
(one cannot stop breathing for more than a few seconds) whereas, for 
instance, the function of the stomach is submitted to organizational closure 
over a longer period of time (one can stop eating for days). Yet, although 
the period of time may vary, the very idea of organizational closure requires 
the assumption that the organization whose trait performs a function at time 
T1 is the same organization that maintains the trait at T2.  
Now, a self-maintaining organization, as an intrinsically temporally 
extended phenomenon, may undergo various changes and modifications in 
time. Indeed, as mentioned above, organizational self-maintenance occurs in 
far-from-equilibrium conditions, which means, among other things, that 
biological self-maintaining systems (and their parts) are essentially 
precarious, tend to decay and cannot exist except in the presence of an 
adequate flow of energy and matter, which enables the continuous 
regeneration of the whole organization. Self-maintenance occurs, then, in 
spite of the continuous replacement of the material components. In this 
sense, a self-maintaining system, be it physical or biological, remains the 
same while changing all the time, because of its dissipative nature. In 
addition, biological systems may also undergo mayor structural and 
morphological changes during their lifetime, due to adaptations, accidental 
events (injuries, etc.) and, especially, because of development.  
If, due to their material, structural and morphological differences, one were 
to consider the various temporal instances O1, O2… On, as distinct systems 
with distinct organizations, then self-maintenance, organizational closure 
and functions could not exist. A trait would be produced by a given 
organization, let us say O1, and would contribute to maintaining another 
organization, let us say O2. No organization would actually self-maintain, no 
trait could be submitted to organizational closure and functions could not be 
ascribed from an organizational perspective. 
The organizational account of functions relies, then, on the theoretical 
assumption according to which the various temporal instances of a system, 
in spite of any changes which may occur, can be considered as instances of 
the same encompassing self-maintaining organization, to the extent that 
their constitutive organizational properties are causally transmitted from one 
instance to another instance by the maintenance of a material connection 
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between them. The causal transmission of the organization (and specifically 
its constitutive processes and relations between components) through the 
various (temporal) instances of a system is the criterion by which the 
encompassing system, as well as its parts, is described as being the same, 
and thus, in the case in question here, able to realize self-maintenance 
although, of course, other criteria could also exist on the basis of which the 
various instances would not be taken as instances of the same system. If, in 
a relevant sense, a given system or a given temporal instance of a system 
possesses a constitutive organization because of its causal and material 
connection with a previous instance possessing the same organization, then 
it can be claimed that the two systems or the two instances are in fact 
instances of the same encompassing organization. In particular, the same is 
also true if the transmitted organization is a self-maintaining organization.  
The central thesis of this paper is that self-maintaining organizations, which 
ground the ascription of cross-generation functions, and specifically 
reproductive functions, meet with the very same characterization as those 
organizations which ground intra-generation functions. While they may 
differ in important ways, the two classes of self-maintaining organizations 
do not differ with respect to the relevant properties that ground functional 
ascriptions.  
Cross-generation functions are subject to organizational closure within the 
frame of self-maintaining organizations whose extension in time goes 
beyond the lifespan of individual organisms. For instance, the mammal 
semen, by inseminating the ovum, contributes to the maintenance of the 
organization by contributing to the production of a new organism to replace 
the previous one. In turn, the organization (realized by both the reproducer 
and the reproduced system) exerts several constraints under which the 
semen is produced and maintained. The crucial point is that the organization 
of the system constituted by the conjunction of the reproducing and 
reproduced organisms (in this specific case, a minimal lineage with two 
elements) has exactly the same status, in terms of self-maintenance, as that 
of the individual organisms. The fact of considering the organization of 
individual organisms or their conjunction as the relevant self-maintaining 
organization is only a question of “zooming”, and depends on the 
explanatory exigencies for functional ascriptions.  
Since what matters in the case of organizational self-maintaining systems is 
the fact that they use their own constitutive organization to exert a causal 
influence on the maintenance of (at least part of) their own conditions of 
existence, then the organization of the “encompassing system” composed by 
a reproducer and a reproduced system itself fits the characterization of a 
self-maintaining organization. The process of reproduction, in this sense, 
simply constitutes one of the functions through which the organization 
succeeds in maintaining itself beyond the lifespan of individual organisms. 
Since the encompassing system composed by the reproducer and 
reproduced organism possesses a (temporally wider) self-maintaining 
organization, reproductive traits are subject to organizational closure, and 
their functions are correctly grounded in the organizational account.  
Moreover, the organization of individual organisms is rather a process of 
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becoming – a process of development—followed by a process of decay, 
than a stable, unchanged, situation of self-maintenance. In the history of 
each organism, we witness therefore an unfolding of (different forms of) 
self-maintenance (within a given identity), where reproduction ensures the 
long-term continuity of a given self-maintaining identity.  
Why do cross-generation functions appear problematic? Intuitively, the 
ontological problem discussed by Delancey seems to apply to our account 
insofar as reproduction involves a dramatic transition from the reproducer to 
the reproduced organism, so much so, in fact, that it cannot be maintained 
that they constitute the same system. Given that reproduction may involve 
phenomena like embryogenesis, development and even the possible 
simultaneous presence of the reproducer and reproduced system – objectors 
might argue – such causal and phenomenological discontinuities prevent us 
from considering these systems as instances of the same self-maintaining 
system. Only individual organisms are genuine self-maintaining systems. 
In our view, this objection is wrong, since it is based on an insufficient 
understanding of the conditions under which an organization can be 
considered self-maintaining. The crucial requirement, as discussed above, is 
the causal transmission of the organizational properties. Two self-
maintaining systems on a shorter temporal scale may be said to constitute 
two temporal instances of a single self-maintaining organization on a larger 
time scale, if it can be shown that self-maintenance has been causally 
transmitted from one instance to the other by the maintenance of a material 
continuity between them. Has the self-maintenance of one instance resulted 
in the self-maintenance of the other instance or, to put it another way, has 
the subsequent instance inherited its self-maintaining organization from the 
previous instance? Since the answer to these questions is, in a fundamental 
sense, affirmative for the case of the relationship between the reproducer 
and the reproduced system, we claim that the encompassing organization 
including them is itself a self-maintaining organization which maintains 
itself also through reproduction.  
As Griesemer has pointed out, the reproduction process does involve the 
material connection between the reproducer and reproduced system:  
“Reproduction (...) is the multiplication of entities with a material 
overlap of parts between parents and offspring. Material overlap means 
that parts of the parents (at some time) become parts of the offspring (at 
some other time). Thus reproduction is no mere transmission or copying 
of form -- it is a flow of matter” (Griesemer, 2002: 105, emphasis 
addedxi).  
In fact, this means that what happens in this case is the realization of a FFE 
recursive organization, which displays a spatial proliferation of its core 
recursive cycle. And this is explained ultimately in terms of the time 
relation between the production and decay of the constitutive components in 
a FFE recursive organization. If the rate of replacement of the constitutive 
components is faster than its decay, the autopoiesis of the system will 
prompt it to establish reproductive cycles: the system will grow and 
reproduce; otherwise, it will disintegrate. Only in the very unlikely case of 
coincidence between the rates of replacement and decay will the autopoiesis 
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of the system realize self-maintenance without reproduction (Zepik et al. 
2001). 
Thus, in a prebiotic chemical scenario, self-reproduction is simply the most 
frequent form of self-maintenance. When, in a further step, reproduction 
takes place through genetic mechanisms, it still remains a dynamical FFE 
cyclic process: template-like reproduction cannot take place without 
catalysts: it occurs within a “metabolic” autocatalytic cycle (SM 
organization). As Eschenmosser (2007) has pointed out, both forms of 
(self)re-production (be they “genetic” or “metabolic”, i.e., due to a template-
like structure or to an autocatalytic reaction cycle) are intrinsically cyclic 
processes. In other words, reproduction is a specific (but far more frequent) 
form of self-maintenance or self-production (autopoiesis). And this 
fundamental fact is what grounds Griesemer’s remarks on the strong 
material embeddedness of reproductive dynamics within the metabolic 
dynamics. 
The macroscopic transition produced by the reproductive process can then 
be seen as the way in which the organization actually manages to self-
maintain beyond the temporal boundaries of individual organisms. Just as 
the various temporal instances of an individual organism are considered, 
despite changes and modifications, as a single self-maintaining organization 
to the extent that the organizational properties are causally transmitted 
through a material connection across the various instances, so too are the 
various instances of the inter-generational organization considered as a 
single self-maintaining organization due to the causal transmission across 
the instances. The operation is exactly the same, the difference lies only in 
the level of temporal zoom through which self-maintenance is observed.  
This is why development is an essential feature of the self-maintaining 
organization of living organisms. Once we see reproduction as a process 
materially connecting the reproducer and the reproduced organizations, 
development appears as a necessary step in this continuous process of 
complex self-maintenance. Indeed, self-maintenance of biological 
individuals cannot be ensured but through a continuous unfolding of 
changes including reproduction and development.  
From this perspective, reproduction is functional because it stems from a 
means of self-maintenance of an organization. Understanding the 
reproductive role of a biological trait only as a causal connection between 
different systems leads us to understand reproduction simply in terms of its 
contribution to the self-maintenance of a particular type of organization, 
such as a species or population. This would lead us to the problem related to 
these kinds of “type-like” organizations mentioned in the section 3.2. (i.e., 
species, lineages and so on). In fact, reproduction is functional, and the 
cross-generation traits have functions, because they are related to the self-
maintenance of a FFE token organizationxii, not because they involve a 
“formal” causal connection between a reproducer and a reproduced system. 
The organizational properties of reproducer and reproduced are linked not 
only by a mere “formal” relationship, but also by a material causation 
showing that both reproducer and reproduced are parts of the same FFE 
self-maintaining organization. Since the only relevant ground for functional 
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attributions is organizational self-maintenance, all other criteria of 
distinction between biological systems seem irrelevant for this matter. This 
is why reproductive traits can be said to be subject to organizational closure 
and why, then, we ascribe functions to them. 
4. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to provide a solution for an ontological problem 
which the organizational account has to resolve, i.e. the need to account for 
intra-generation and cross-generation functions without referring to 
different natural kinds, and avoiding the splitting account proposed by 
Delancey. Both intra- and cross-generation functions can be defined as 
causal effects of a trait subject to organizational closure in self-maintaining 
systems, since the characterization of an organizational self-maintaining 
system applies to both kinds of systems which ground the two classes of 
functions.    
It should be emphasized that this solution to the ontological problem stems 
from the specific version of the organizational account that we propose, 
which appeals to the idea of self-maintaining organizations as the relevant 
ground for the naturalization of biological functions. Indeed, at least two 
implications of our proposal for the philosophical debate should be 
mentioned.  
On the one hand, our account integrates and justifies Schlosser’s and 
McLaughlin’s accounts, by showing why it is legitimate to defend a unified 
organizational account of both intra- and cross-generation biological 
functions. These accounts are open to Delancey’s criticism because, by 
defining functions as the self-reproduction of traits within complex systems, 
they have to acknowledge the distinction between the self-sustenance of an 
instance within an individual system and the self-reproduction of a new 
instance of the same type in a different system. If the definition is restricted 
to the self-reproduction of the trait, the account cannot avoid distinguishing 
between the two cases, and has to split the definition. Our account corrects 
Schlosser’s one in two crucial aspects. Firstly, it defines functions not as 
causal contributions to the self-reproduction of traits, but rather as 
contributions of traits, subject to organizational closure, to the self-
maintenance of a system. Secondly, it identifies organizational self-
maintaining systems, and not generically complex systems, as the relevant 
class of systems that grounds functional ascriptions.  
On the other hand, although there is a close relationship between the notion 
of organizational self-maintenance and that of autonomy used by 
Christensen and Bickhard, it seems to us that the former is a better candidate 
as a naturalized grounding for (both intra- and cross-generation) biological 
functions. By focusing on organizational self-maintenance, our account 
provides a theoretical justification for the idea that it is the same 
organization which self-maintains through the reproduction transition. Just 
as we admit that the various instances of a trait within an individual 
organism can be considered as the same token in spite of continuous 
changes, we can admit that traits bearing cross-generation functions in the 
reproducer and reproduced organisms can be said to be the same tokens (as 
parts of the same organization), when using (and, possibly, only when 
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using) organizational self-maintenance as a criterion of identification.   
We conclude that our account succeeds in dealing with Delancey’s 
challenge, since it explains how we are to identify organizations that ground 
cross-generation functions without reference to individual organisms. As a 
consequence, we suggest applying Ockham’s razor to this debate, 
abandoning a splitting account, and maintaining a unified definition of 
functions from an organizational perspective.   
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iv According to Schlosser, functional attributions are meaningful only in a specified period 
of time (p. 318). The second line of the formula means that, taking t0 as the beginning of 
the considered period T, t0 precedes t, which precedes t + x + y which, in turn, precedes the 
end of T (expressed by t0+ T). 
v Schlosser emphasize that functional ascriptions necessarily refer to trait types: “The 
concept of self-re-production is meaningful only if statements (1) and (2) of a function 
ascription are conceived as statements about types. An individual state or trait does not re-
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produce itself per definition. When we talk about recurrence or re-production of a certain 
state X, we do not claim that an individual state X1 (t1) is re-established at a later time t2; 
we only claim that another state of the same type, e.g., X2 (t2), is present at t2. As a 
consequence, a function can be ascribed to an individual X1 (t1) only insofar as it can be 
treated as a token of a type X(t). Accordingly, there can be no function ascription that 
applies only to a single token of a type.” (Schlosser, 1998: 316-317). 
vi Although Delancey does not explicitly mention him, his criticism holds also for 
McLaughlin’s view which, as we specify in the previous section, shares with Schlosser the 
idea that the notion of “trait self-reproduction” can be applied to the same trait token in a 
given system, as well as to another trait token of the same type in a different system.  
vii The criterion is intrinsic, since not imposed by an external observer, according to some 
extrinsic reason, and naturalized, since related to a factual feature of the system’s nature, 
and not deduced from some metaphysical or moral principle. 
viiiA very basic example of mutual dependence is active transportation through the cell 
membrane. The level of chemical concentrations that the membrane's active transport 
retains within the cell is necessary for some metabolic reactions to maintain the appropriate 
rate to sustain the network of reactions, which in turn produces the membrane, and so on in 
a circular and interdependent manner. 
ix This definition differs slightly in terminology from that proposed in Mossio et al. (2009). 
x The idea of autonomy usually has a stronger sense than that of self-maintaining 
organization since it is supposed to capture all relevant properties of living systems (Ruiz-
Mirazo & Moreno, forthcoming; Varela, 1979). In this sense, if an agreement could be 
reached regarding taking self-maintaining organization as a necessary and sufficient 
grounding for biological functions, it might be preferable to reserve the label “autonomous 
systems” for the actual biological instances of a self-maintaining system, i.e. individual 
organisms 
xi This point has been the object of an important debate in the philosophy of biology. In the 
context of Darwinian’s theory of evolution, Griesemer’s account has been criticized by 
Godfrey-Smith (2009, pp 79-86) who argues that certain viruses show a purely formal way 
of reproduction. However, Godfrey-Smith’s example is not relevant for our case, since his 
claim that there is not necessarily a material connection between reproducer and reproduced 
applies only to molecules (or, at most to aggregates of molecules), not to FFE self-
maintaining organizations, which imply a gathering together of different reactions, i.e., 
embedding the processes of synthesis of new structures --and degradation of other ones-- in 
a recursively viable reaction network. Furthermore, if we consider only structural (not 
organizational) replicators, there would be no functional domain (Moreno & Ruiz-Mirazo, 
2009). 
xii Although criteria exist which hold that separate organisms are different tokens and 
similar types, we believe that the reproductive cycle, as such, is a material instance of a 
specific FFE self-maintaining organization, and hence is itself a token (although a different 
token from self-bounded organisms). This is the criterion we use to say that cross-
generation traits are functional within the framework of a self-maintaining token 
organization. 
